Microblading

Microblading: A Closer Look

Abstract

An erroneous position attributed to Judaism is that tattooed individuals cannot be buried in Jewish cemeteries. Nevertheless, tattooing is clearly Biblically prohibited by Jewish law. Here, we define this prohibition and determine how those qualifications affect cosmetic tattooing, specifically, microblading.

Discussion

Many methods are utilized by people hoping to attain a desirable set of facial features. An area that has become increasingly targeted is the eyebrows. Some find their eyebrows too thick and utilize waxing or threading to remove excess hairs, while others believe their eyebrows are too thin and use pencil to fill in the missing components. This latter group includes people who have undergone some sort of medical treatment or illness that resulted in complete or partial hair loss. Cosmetologists utilize cosmetic tattooing—a process in which pigment is inserted into the shallow layer of skin—to offer a more authentic and longer lasting makeover appearance. This procedure is accomplished through either traditional tattoos—a tattoo “gun” that penetrates the outer dermal layer and subsequently inserts pigmentation—or by use of a very thin blade dipped in pigmentation which allows the artist to have more control over the knife, allowing for a more delicate and natural look^[1]. The second method is the one that is used in the microblading process and is the primary subject of this article. The immediate halachic concern is the permissibility of the actual tattooing, however, halacha provides a list of criteria that must be adhered to in order to term color on the skin a tattoo, criteria that may not necessarily be met when discussing microblading. There also exists a more global issue regarding the initial incision that results in at least a minimal amount of bleeding, namely, an issur chabala, the prohibition against wounding yourself. Therefore, when considering the permissibility of microblading two separate issues must be resolved- the nature of tattoos and the incision required to insert pigmentation under the skin.

The quintessentially proscribed biblical tattoo (vyakira 19,28) is one which is made for the purposes of idol worship^[2]. As such, the prevalent understanding assumes that tattooing was a method utilized to declare one’s allegiance to an idol. It then follows that to transgress the biblically prohibited mandate one must follow the procedure done by the pagan worshippers that the Torah commands to avoid^[3]. Deterrence from that procedure would render the tattoo an issur d’rabbanan at best.

Rabbi Baruch Shraga^[4], argues that contemporary tattooing is similar to that which is biblically proscribed, as they both require an incision before insertion of pigmentation. He also posits that there is no fundamental distinction between permanent and semi-permanent tattoos. Most significantly, Rabbi Shraga utilizes the Rema’s position to underscore the correctness of his view. Slave owners had a common practice of branding their slaves with tattoos to demonstrate ownership and prevent runaways. The Rema argues that lchatchila slave owners should not engage in this method, even though it is not at all analogous to pagan worshipper’s tattooing behaviors. Rabbi Shraga maintains that the Rema’s position categorically differentiates between Jews, who enjoy the status of “because you are a holy nation,” and slaves; Jews even b’dieved are not allowed to utilize tattooing while Non-Jews may be branded b’dieved. He further assumes that the tattoos used to brand a slave were not necessarily letters or symbols, but could even be composed of arbitrary marks, like marks used with cosmetic tattoos^[5]. Subsequently, Rabbi Shraga maintains that Halacha does not permit the use of cosmetic tattoos in any circumstance.

Rabbi Shraga’s presentation is by no means obvious. Regarding his first argument, there is a debate among the commentators as to the order in which the tattoo is made. Rabbi Shraga assumes as a matter of unequivocal fact that the order entails incision followed by coloring, however, as mentioned, there are two methods used by cosmetologists to create an eyebrow tattoo, the conventional tattoo (incision and subsequent insertion of pigment) or microblading, which involves the incision and pigmentation to occur in one step. Irrespective of which commentator is preferred, the reduction of a two-step process to one-step differentiates classic cosmetic tattooing from microblading and Rabbi Shraga may amend his position^[6].

Rabbi Shraga also asserts that there is no fundamental distinction between permanent and temporary tattoos. The process of cosmetic tattooing involves inserting dye into the shallow end of the dermal layer which results in the pigment falling out within three years. Therefore, the case can be made that since biblically defined tattoos are tattoos that are permanent, cosmetic tattooing are at most rabbinic. Without quoting sources, Rabbi Shraga puzzlingly assumes that the subtle difference in these categories only change the obligation for malkos if one transgresses the prohibition but not the biblical nature of the prohibition..

Rabbi Shraga’s approach relies on his stringent leanings on the individual level of each issur. Nevertheless, Rabbi Shraga does not stand alone; he mentions that he consulted with several poskim, such as Rav Ovadya Yosef, Rav Eliyashev, Rav Fisher and Rav Kanievsky, who all assume a similar conclusion. It is important to note that their analysis is never presented and the facts that they were operating with may very well be considered archaic as new advancements in cosmetology techniques emerge. Moreover, Rabbi Sharaga’s essay is written in response to an otherwise healthy woman who only wanted to enhance her facial features. He does not address people who suffer from a sever defilement and wish to utilize cosmetic tattoos to appear “normal”.

Rav Ovadya Yosef, in a later work^[7], directly acknowledges a distinction between a woman who wishes only to enhance her features versus one who suffers from a severe deformity, retracting his position stated in Rabbi Shraga’s essay. Rav Ovadya first presents the argument that tleisi d’rabbanan, three separate rabbinic decrees, would render an action mutter l’chatchila^[8]. That is, the temporary status of cosmetic tattoos, the lack of actual letters or symbols and the fact that the tattoo clearly has no pagan intent, would result in this action having no significant resemblance to the biblically proscribed action and be completely permissible. Rav Ovadya then argues that even if there still exists a rabbinic prohibition, the case of a person suffering from a severe deformity has even greater allowance for permissibility because of the qualifications of Tosfos^[9]. He renders someone who suffers from an embarrassing ailment such that they refuse to be seen in public to be considered a choleh,^[10] which could then allow for dismissal of rabbinic prohibitions. These arguments persuade Rav Ovadya to allow women who suffer from some form of hair loss symptom to utilize cosmetic tattooing^[11]. He uses less equivocal terms when discussing the case of women who only want to perfect their otherwise natural look, only writing that there is no reason to admonish them.

Rav Ovadya’s presentation is somewhat puzzling. He does not need the reason of Tosfos to allow use of cosmetic tattooing; the tleisi d’rabbanan that allows unequivocal allowance for tattooing should be sufficient. As such, there is no reason to differentiate the woman suffering from severe hair loss from the ones who only wish to enhance their otherwise normal look. Moreover, many women would not walk in public without first applying makeup. Even working under that assumption that the reasoning given by Tosfos is required, these women should also be placed in the same category as the ones who suffer from objectively classified deformities and also have unequivocal allowance to get cosmetic tattoos^[12].

Rabbi Bitzri^[13], using a different formulation, does in fact, completely allow all women to utilize the advancements of cosmetic tattoos. He ascertains that all rishonim agree that the discussion revolves around an issue that is only melacha shein tzriecha l’gofo—an action which has an unintended result (similarity to tattooing for pagan purposes), which then changes the stakes of the issue to one which is only d’rabbanan. The lower level issur is then completely removed by use of t’liesi drabbanan (no letters are formed, the tattoos do not involve idol worship and gadol kavod habrios^[14]) which would allow microblading in all circumstances.

Moreover, Rabbi Bitzri offers the more obvious understanding of the Rema in contrast to Rabbi Shraga (mentioned above). Rabbi Bitzri maintains that the Rema does not allow tattooing of slaves because of the concern of maaris eiyan; people that are unfamiliar with the purpose of the tattoo might assume it was for pagan purposes. As such, the Rema would permit cosmetic tattooing that no one would mistake for pagan intent and is composed of arbitrary markings that the Rema never assumed to prohibit.

A completely different approach is advocated by Rabbi Shraga Schienobolg^[15]. He understands the halachic nature of a tattoo as being one which is completely foreign to the skin. The argument is somewhat logical, although not found in earlier sources. The biblical prohibition was to prevent Jews from branding themselves, publicly affirming allegiance to a particular idol or “cult.” Based on this, a tattoo whose purpose is not to demonstrate any symbol—on the contrary, it’s use is uniquely one which is intended to blend into one’s skin by enhancing the eyebrows—should be completely permissible. This novel approach is an idea unique to Schienobolg and is rejected by Rav Dovid Bleich as a position that misunderstands the fundamentals of the prohibition. Rav Bleich maintains that the accepted definition of a tattoo is a marking on one’s skin, irrespective of whether or not it creates a “natural look.”

Rav Bleich espouses the position presented by Rabbi Tauber that permits a person who does not assist in the procedure to get tattooed. That is, the Rambam assumes that the biblical prohibition of tattooing applies to the one performing the procedure and the one getting tattooed. Rabbi Tauber posits that the Rambam would agree that rabbinically defined tattoos are only prohibited to the one administrating the tattoo. The recipients are only liable if they assist with the procedure, an action that can be done by simply moving their heads in the right direction. However, this is unlikely considering that it is common for people to fall asleep while getting tattooed^[16]. As a result, there is strong standing to allow microblading even l’chatchila when a non-Jew performs the act.

In sum, cosmetic tattooing presents at least six variations from the biblically defined tattoo that would redefine colloquially named tattoos as ones that the Torah would not recognize as tattoos at all^[17]. One, the idea that prohibited tattoos are those that are specifically utilized for pagan worship^[18]. Two, the pigmentation must form either letters or clear symbols,^[19] as opposed to simply coloring of the dermal layer. Three, the biblical definition of tattoo requires a very specific procedure; the order is debated by early commentators as to whether the issur applies when there’s an incision and then insertion of pigmentation or the reverse^[20]. Four, tattoos must last indefinitely^[21], cosmetic tattoos, at their best, only last for three years. Five, the novel suggestion that cosmetic tattoos by their very nature cannot be defined as a tattoo as their purpose is to blend in with the skin. And six, that karka olam—sitting motionless while another performs the inappropriate behavior—is not an issue for rabbinic decrees^[22]. The rabbinic arbitrator that does not allow for the use of cosmetic tattoos would need to formulate the (or most of the) six considerations stringently. The next issue that needs to be addressed is the prohibition against wounding yourself^[23], a concern that none of the aforementioned poskim explicitly address^[24] in their responses regarding this topic. Chabala is a major issue with regards to plastic surgery and is only waived when the procedure is necessary i.e. when there is a choleh. Cosmetic surgery, which by its very nature is not geared for the sick patient, should then be prohibited. The simplest and most popular solution^[25] is to reevaluate the definitions. That is, it is not inconceivable to postulate that chabala, by definition, would only prohibit actions that result in destruction^[26]. However, plastic surgery, or microblading, should not be defined as chabala because the net result is actually one of improvement^[27].

An alternative solution can be reached by examining the continuum of chabala and choleh. The issur chabala is suspended for patients whose treatment or diagnosis requires some sort of incision, such as a blood test or the like. Therefore, utilizing the Tosfos classification of psychological pain rendering someone a choleh would allow for the suspension of chabala for someone who would be embarrassed to walk around in public without filling in their eyebrows.

In conclusion, the halachic arbitrators described above struggle with how to best define cosmetic tattooing in reference to biblically prohibited tattoos. Their conclusions range from unequivocal approval to complete rejection. The majority of poskim maintain that cosmetic tattooing is permissible specifically with regards to people suffering from severe ailments and not just for the common patron. However, their positions may need to be revisited because of two considerations. The Tosfos position (endorsed by most poskim) should allow any woman who would not be seen in public without makeup to get cosmetic tattooing. A position that also allows for removal of the issur chabala. This conclusion can also be maintained if the incision is not classified as a chabala, considering its ultimate goal. Additionally, advancements in microblading result in the incision and insertion of pigmentation to occur in one motion, further providing reason to be lenient. Therefore, it seems that microblading should be permissible for any woman who would be embarrassed to be seen in public without makeup.

1. See http://www.cosmetictattoo.org/article/microblading-first-things-first.html and https://browsbywhitney.com/microblading/. ↑

2. For an expansive list of sources see Bleich, JD “Survery of Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature: Medical and Cosmetic Tattooing,” Tradition Winter 2009, Issue 42.4. ↑

3. Gemara Makkus 21a. ↑

4. T’chummin 18 p. 118 ↑

5. Note Rabbi Bitzri (presented later) who offers a more simplistic and popular approach. ↑

6. The validity of this argument is presented by Rabbi Leib Ettlinger. Rav Dovid Bleich rejected the argument on the platform of it being irrelevant because tattoo guns involve a two-step process. However, that assumption is only relevant with regards to conventional tattoo methods, not microblading. ↑

7. Taharas HaBayis III, p. 29. ↑

8. See Teshuvot Radvaz III, 589. ↑

9. Shabbas 50b. bshviel tzaru ↑

10. A claim not accepted by all poskim. ↑

11. Another important heter Rav Ovadya offers is that he maintains that there is no issur chatzitza in regards to mikvah because of the pigmentation. This position is actually based on the position of the Rashba, incorrectly attributed to the Ramban, in Tshvos 124. ↑

12. Theoretically this same logic should also allow these women to have a non-Jew apply makeup for them Shabbas morning, as a choleh shien bo sakana. ↑

13. Tchumin 10, p. 282. ↑

14. This argument is very similar to Tosfos classification of people who are embarrassed to walk around in public. ↑

15. Shut Shraga HaMeir No 44. ↑

16. https://browsbywhitney.com/microblading/ ↑

17. For a comprehensive analysis see Rabbi J.D. Bleichs’s Contemporary Halachic Problems Vol VII p. 201 and Nishmas Avraham (third edition) YD 180, 2 and 3. ↑

18. Rambam, Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 12:11, Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 253 and Bet Yosef,Yoreh De’ah 180. While,

    Rashi,17 Makkot 21a, s.v. ketovet ka’aka disagrees. ↑

19. Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 253. R. Jacob Ettlinger, Arukh la-Ner, Makkot 21a. Piskei ha-Tosafot, Makkot, sec. 32; R. Ovadiah of Bartenura, Makkot 3:6; Semak, no. 72; and Rabbenu Yonatan, Makkot 21a, ↑

20. Shakh, Yoreh De’ah 180:1, Shulhan Arukh, Mishnat Hakhamim, no. 57, sec. 1. Rivan makkus ibid. Bach 180:2. ↑

21. Rashi makkus ibid. Rashi v’yikra 19,28. Pski rid makkus ibid. ↑

22. This final notion is most helpful for procedures that involve anesthesia, where the patient is completely unconscious. This argument is utilized by Rav Dovid Bleich in a footnote (80) to allow tattooing of the nipple by a non-Jew during breast reconstruction surgery. ↑

23. ↑

24. While writing his conclusion, Shraga intriguingly includes the issur chabala as an aside without offering further explanation. The issur chabala is an issue only if there is no prohibition of tattooing. That is, in every tattoo there is an intrinsic act of chabala. That chabala should not be classified as such since it falls within the parameters of the tattoo prohibition. The issue of chabala is only raised in regards to poskim who maintain that cosmetic tattoos are permitted. ↑

25. See Iggris Moshe CM 2:56. Yabia Omer 8, CM 12. Minchas Shlomo Tanina 86:3. ↑

26. See the different versions of Rambam Chovel uMazik 4:5. ↑

27. Note the Titz Eliezer (18, 41) in his essay on plastic surgery where he argues ein tzyir k’elokieno, that it is impossible to improve the natural look provided by Heaven and as such any plastic surgery would be considered an issur chabala. This argument is perplexing at best and is not accepted by contemporary poskim. ↑